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This  article  focuses  on  the  mutations  of  rights  from  instruments  of
inclusion to instruments of exclusion. It focuses on multiple
exclusionary interpretations of legitimacy of international human rights
law  that  create  and  propagate  otherness.  The  text  analyses  the
understanding  and  role  of  ‘legitimate  community  of  rights’  in
contemporary crises of recognition and critically evaluates how this
notion excludes those deemed too different to belong. The article does
so  primarily  in  light  of  managing  religious  difference  and  argues  that
European human rights regimes have created two distinct categories of
dissidents seen as subversive and a priori excluded from the protection
of rights – the ‘barbarians’ and the ‘radicals’. This analysis begins with a
discussion of the theoretical notions of rights and legal legitimacy and
their application in contemporary human rights case-law. It
subsequently theorises the consequences of legitimising a
homogenously constructed ‘community’ as the ultimate authority and its
impact on reversal of the emancipatory potential of rights.
* Senior Lecturer, Australian National University.
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1. Introduction
A  Europe  bound  by  a  common  set  of  rights  and  inclusive  of  all
communities and identities seemed to be the ultimate objective of
European integration processes (TEU, Preamble; ECHR, Preamble).
Rights and principles of inclusion have been expanding rapidly to
become overarching principles of constitutional regimes, European
human rights law and European Union (EU) law. The jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) within the framework of
the Council of Europe (CoE) and the ultimate inclusion of rights in the
Treaty of Lisbon promised a seemingly mighty weapon in protection of
diversity.
Yet, to the disillusionment of many, these legal developments have
not prevented the emergence of new forms of cultural racism (Lentin &
Titley 2011, 49–84), the crisis of recognition discourse also known as so-
called ‘post-multiculturalism’ (Kymlicka 2010; Vertovec 2010;
Gozdecka, Kmak & Ercan 2015) and new forms of othering (Gozdecka
2015).  Developments  such as  minaret  bans,  face-covering  bans  or  the
recent burkini bans have shaped a picture of constant crisis rather than
a strengthened commitment to diversity. In this crisis, discourses and
discussions of the legitimacy of contemporary international and
supranational rights regimes have unexpectedly contributed to cultural
othering. While the legitimacy of rights is an issue of great importance,
constant preoccupation with who has the right to decide about our rights
propelled the emergence of tensions leading to a struggle between
different  notions  of  a  legitimate  community  of  rights.  This  in  turn
resulted in the reversal of the logic of rights leading to multiple
exclusionary legal developments restricting the rights of some
communities (Gozdecka 2015, 2015a). These legal changes reflected the
discussion  on  who  is  the  most  legitimate  community  to  legislate  and
enjoy rights.
This  article  analyses  the  understanding  and  role  of  legitimacy
discourses in contemporary crises of recognition visible in European
rights regimes and critically evaluates the development of emerging
homogenising notions of a community authorised to legislate rights. It
further draws on the idea of paradigm and excluded subjects developed
in my earlier work (Gozdecka 2015) and expands it to argue that fixation
with legitimacy led to creation of otherising tools allowing for cultural
marginalisation of groups and identities deemed unworthy. These
othering tools resulted in the creation of two distinct categories of
dissidents seen as subversive and dangerous to the legitimate
community of rights ‒ the ‘barbarians’ and the ‘radicals’. I argue that
instead of guaranteeing legitimacy of rights, these discourses have
served as a defence of established cultural hegemonies, a priori
excluding some subjects from protection of rights. My analysis begins
with a discussion of the theoretical notions of legal legitimacy of rights
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and the role of the community in legitimating processes and
subsequently moves on to discuss their application in the contemporary
human rights case-law of the ECtHR. It then critically evaluates the
construction of legitimacy of rights derived from the idea of a
homogenously constructed ‘community’. Further it illustrates the
impact of these discourses on the reversal of the emancipatory potential
of rights in judicial decisions concerning culturally sensitive questions
of freedom of religion. Finally it engages in an effort to suggest an
alternative form of legitimacy focused not on the community but on the
emancipatory potential of rights. This alternative, drawing on
Levinasian ethics, suggests that reconstructing the emancipatory
potential of rights is possible with a focus on responsibility for alterity
and emancipation rather than a homogenously defined legitimate
community.
2. The expanding rights regimes of Europe and the problem of
legitimacy
From the drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) to the inclusion of rights in the jurisprudence of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ, later the Court of Justice of the European Union
– CJEU) and the ultimate recognition of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (Charter) rights have taken their place as
a cornerstone of European democracies and the foundations of
democratic communities. Since adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, rights
have become legally affirmed as values that Europeans share in
common:
The  Union  is  founded  on  the  values  of  respect  for  human  dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These
values  are  common  to  the  Member  States  in  a  society  in  which
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and
equality between women and men prevail (TEU, Article 2).
The expansion of the overarching idea of rights and their importance
for Europe and Europeans has unsurprisingly resulted in a rich debate
on their legitimacy and relationship in domestic, international and
European legal systems. Famously and on many occasions Jürgen
Habermas has discussed the legitimacy of rights and their role for the
community, both local and international. In a Habermasian model
rights are legitimate only if they are the outcome of public deliberation
by all  who could possibly be affected by them and could express their
consent and opinion in the process of their creation (Habermas 1993).
But at the same time rights as deeper values provide a basis of legitimacy
for  the  politics  of  the  international  community.  Having  said  that,
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Habermas sees  rights  as  expanding beyond the  immediate  polity  and,
drawing his theory of rights on the idea of Kantian peace, he conceives
of them as a legitimate basis for international peace. The legitimacy of
rights at international level is conceived of as an extension and a logical
consequence of the constitutional rule of law (Habermas 1998, 199). In
this supranational model, power politics are curtailed by judicial powers
operating in a functional global public sphere bound by a set of human
rights  (Habermas  2009,  124).  It  is  not  only  that  international  human
rights are legitimate as an extension of domestic deliberation processes
but at the same time they also serve as legitimating tools conceived of in
deliberative processes on an international level.
Having gradually acquired the role of legal fundamental principles,
the question of legitimacy of rights has been rephrased to the question
of their role as the very tools of legitimation (e.g. Dworkin, 1978). For
instance Kaarlo Tuori’s three-level model of law (Tuori 2002, 193–194)
sees rights as deep legitimating sources of changeable legal norms.
Rights belong to the deepest structure of law and are seen as the most
basic categories among other fundamental principles. At that deepest
level Tuori envisions that rights are similar in a majority of legal systems
and may play an important role in legitimating surface level norms in a
process called legitimacy by justifiability (Tuori 2002, 245). Law on the
surface level, according to Tuori, is normatively legitimate if and only if
it can be legitimated through principles from the subsurface (middle or
deep) levels.
But emphasis on the legitimating role of rights has not stopped the
debate on the mutual relationship between different legal regimes
securing rights and the respective communities responsible for those
regimes. The discussion of this relationship has been polarised ranging
from  the  vision  of  different  rights  regimes  as  a  structure  of  mutually
reinforcing legal orders (Pernice 2008) to the vision of rights as existing
in a potential state of conflict (Sweet 2009, 245). The emphasis on
possible conflict that might include issues of incompatible rights and
diverse protected interests propelled the search for another potential
source of legitimacy. After all, legal contestation in problematic cases
could lead to a situation where domestic, international and European
judicial organs become a battlefield of influences (Lasser, 2009). The
resolution models for these conflicts have focused on the role of courts
and international mechanisms of judicial enforcement (Sweet 2009,
245) but were not always able to resolve the possibility of a far-reaching
conflict of interest. The search for legitimacy has therefore led scholarly
discourse further into scrutiny of the role of the political community in
legitimating rights.
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3. What rights for which community?
In the diverse landscape of possibly conflicting rights regimes, inquiry
revolves around the central question: ‘who constitutes the community
best  legitimising  rights  regimes’?   While  the  discussion  on  the
community and rights is complex and involves multiple tensions
between liberalism (e.g. Rawls 1993), communitarianism (e.g. Walzer
1990) and other theories attempting to preserve the emancipatory
potential  of  rights  for  those  marginalised  (e.g.  Douzinas  2000),  the
European discussion went in a slightly different direction: considering
the impact of rights for a post-national community. Models of European
post-national cosmopolitanism, seeing rights as quintessentially
legitimating sources, ascribe to them the role of unifying moral values
capable of binding different members of the European body in spite of
their differences and creating a feeling of common awareness and
belonging  to  a  post-national  community.  Jürgen  Habermas  in  his
famous ‘Why Europe needs a Constitution’, written at the time of the
failed debates concerning the European Constitution project, assigned
just such a role to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, arguing that:
This new awareness of what Europeans have in common has found an
admirable  expression  in  the  EU  Charter  of  Basic  Rights  (…)  The
Charter  goes  beyond  the  limited  view  [of  market  integration]
articulating a social vision of the European project. It also shows what
Europeans link together normatively (Habermas 2004, 27).
But this vision does not solve the possibility of conflict between
different rights regimes. It also risks being overtly Eurocentric and based
on universalising and exclusive notions (Delanty 2002, 349)
consequently disregarding basic societal disagreements concerning law
and notions of rights (Delanty 2002, 248).
The  thin  nature  of  the  international  community  has  been  also
challenged as lacking the appropriate legitimacy for independent
delineation of rights (Besson 2011; 2006). Perceiving the international
community as incapable of appropriate legitimacy has shifted
conceptualisations of a legitimate community to a domestic level. For
instance, according to Samantha Besson rights can be legitimate only if
in a minimal way they match an existing set of domestic human rights
(Besson 2011). Likewise, according to Joseph Weiler the definition of
human rights often differs from polity to polity. Since these differences
reflect fundamental societal choices and are formative for different
communal identities, rights must have their own distinct ‘flavour’
(Weiler 2009, 74). Not unlike Besson and Weiler, Bellamy has also
frequently insisted that European citizens need to have a say in defining
their  rights  (Bellamy  2008;  2006).  The  European  public  sphere,
according to Bellamy, is not yet operative and thus cannot reflect rights
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adequately. For rights to acquire appropriate legitimacy people must
take part in decision-making processes that determine their rights
(Bellamy 2008, 607).
Seeing the immediate political community as the only legitimate
legislator of rights was not of course meant to construct any exclusionary
notions  of  a  community.  Yet,  as  with  any  search  for  essence,  the
unfortunate side effect of these discourses has been the ultimate
narrowing and homogenisation of the idea of a community. The notion
of a political community seen as the only legitimate source of rights risks
was not conceptualised in the vein of those who sought a definition of a
community based on an expression of reciprocal power sharing and fair
minimisation of exclusion by virtue of birth, cultural or religious
belonging (Benhabib 2002, 148). Instead, the essentialisation of
community that occurred replaced this diverse vision with a vision of an
entity focused on homogeneity and preoccupied with unconditional
power to decide whom to include and whom to exclude from the
community and what follows from protection of rights (Gozdecka 2015,
339‒340).
Lentin and Titley call this type of community domocentric (from
domos,  a  place  of  home)  and  identifying  it  as  a  homogenising  body
politic based on a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and emphasising a
place of ‘natural belonging’ (Lentin & Titley 2011, 206). The domocentric
community is a democratic community in its narrowest understanding
based on the sheer numerical majority. While the rule of the majority is
one of the defining features of democracy, multiple scholars have
attempted to add nuance to this narrow understanding by focusing on
protection of minorities (Kymlicka 1995; Patton 2005) or construing the
idea of a community which defies essentialist approaches (Nancy 1991;
Agamben 1993). The domocentric community, however, ignores any
such nuances and is preoccupied with constructing a coherent version of
‘us’ that can be contrasted with many other communities and identities.
In its search for essential definition, the domocentric community
positions itself against any other entity endangering its essence, be it the
European community, cultural or religious minorities, migrants, or even
some  individuals.  What  follows  notions  of  rights  legitimated  by  a
domocentric community are likewise based on exclusive and narrow
notions. When coupled with a homogenous sense of domocentric
community and its identity,  ‘legitimate’  rights can be used as tools for
framing certain lives as more or less worthy of protection, a process
observed in another context by Butler (Butler 2009, 7).  Bringing rights
‘closer’ to their respective communities has often resulted in protection
of the cultural ‘essence’ of a community and deployed rights-based
notions to ‘exclude and stratify the less desirable’ (Lentin & Titley 2011,
206). The resurgence of the domocentric national community has
invaded the discourse on legitimacy and found an expression in multiple
exclusionary developments within and beyond the strict domain of
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rights (Gozdecka 2015). The less desirable is framed as the Other in the
delineation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. While the visibly different become
the first target in this process, the delineation does not stop there. The
excluded  foreignness  mutates  and  I  argue  that  it  can  take  on  two
dimensions.
Most frequently the Other continues to be symbolised by those
traditionally perceived as ‘barbarians’ (Brown 2008, 149–175; Douzinas
2013, 56) – communities and identities whose claims are presented in
terms  of  culture  that  possesses  ‘them’  rather  than  culture  that  is
controlled  by  ‘them’  (Brown  2008,  187).  The  notion  of  a  barbarian
echoes the historical barbarian invasions and operates with the logic of
defending the ‘civilised’ from unwanted intrusion by those considered a
threat  to  it.  The  domocentric  community  focuses  first  on  drawing  a
distinction between the ‘civilised’ and the ‘barbarian’ but it does not stop
there. As the process of identifying the essence continues, the
contemporary exclusion from protection of rights eventually expands
beyond the simple contrast of ‘civilised’ liberalism and ‘barbaric’
cultures. In the end it is driven by a perception of conflict and danger to
the domocentric community coming from any side, including the inside.
Those excluded may come from cultures framed as ‘barbaric’ or may be
of foreign origin, but they may also be those parts of the community who
appeal to cosmopolitan notions legitimating rights and supranational
visions of community (Gozdecka 2015, 337‒339). Those who appeal to
cosmopolitan notions of rights in their struggle with ‘tradition’ or the
‘moral views’ of the majority are seen as another type of threat – one
from the inside. Those who cannot be classified as barbarians are instead
seen as ‘radicals’. Radicals are not obviously foreign, but the danger they
represent for the domus lies in their lack of attachment to the essentially
defined values of the domocentric and homogenously constructed
community. In some sense this danger is even more serious than that
coming  from  the  side  of  the  ‘barbarians’  for  radicals  are  typically  the
foreshadowers of revolutions (e.g. Calhoun 1982; Meyerson 1995).
Radicals announce a break from the status quo and a need for a drastic
departure from the familiar and the known in which the domocentric
community finds comfort. The danger of the radical lies in their capacity
to appeal to various non-domestic values, including values of
transnational formations, to challenge the imagined homogeneity of a
narrow notion of political community (Brown 2008, 187). However,
contemporary notions of the domocentric community legitimating
rights are so narrow that they leave no room for either culturalised
‘barbarians’ or community-breaking ‘radicals’.
The ‘radicals’ and ‘barbarians’ of today are those put in opposition to
‘paradigm  subjects’  (Gozdecka  2015)  of  a  liberal  nation  state
constituting the most legitimate form of domocentric community.
Constructed as a threat to the values, security, laws and rights of a liberal
nation state, ‘radicals’ and ‘barbarians’ must unconditionally yield
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before an exclusive reading of ‘constitutional tradition’, ‘moral views’, or
even ‘equality’. The emerging exclusive competence of the domocentric
community to regulate areas of cultural conflict leads to otherisation
imposed on the basis of ‘unexamined prejudices, ancient battles,
historical injustices and sheer administrative fiat’ (Benhabib 2004, 178).
As  a  result,  ‘radicals’  and  ‘barbarians’  must  all  yield  before  the
homogeneous and domocentric national community and stand in an
uneven position vis-à-vis the state.
Unconditional protection of the interest of domocentric communities
reverses the idea of legitimacy based on unity in difference, common
history or rights. Contrary to hopes for the emergence of an ethos of
pluralisation  (Delanty  2002)  or  unity  in  rights  (Habermas  2004),
bringing rights closer to their respective communities began an era of
otherisation through the discourse of legitimacy. In this discourse,
‘barbarians’ and ‘radicals’ remain perpetually excluded from the realm
of rights whereas the ‘legitimate’ community whose boundaries are
continually narrowing remains both the bearer and the sole source of
rights. In the following section I illustrate how these notions have
entered the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and how the Court has
employed the notions of legitimacy and community in an otherising and
homogenising manner.
4. The fusion of othering and legitimacy discourse in judicial practice
of rights
Not surprisingly, the attention given to the legitimate community has
become  focal  in  cases  dealing  with  culturally  contested  issues.  In  its
jurisprudence concerning such cases, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), as the most prominent European judicial organ dealing
with  issues  of  rights,  quickly  demonstrated  a  shift  acknowledging  the
strong position of the traditionally understood community.
Cases that have directed the reasoning of the Court into the path of
discussing the legitimacy of the community through majoritarian
notions have dealt with a range of culturally contested issues, among
others a face-covering ban (S.A.S. v. France 2001), access to abortion (A,
B and C v. Ireland 2010) and IVF (S.H. and Others v. Austria 2011), the
display of crucifixes in public schools (Lautsi 2009) or publication of
faith-related posters (Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland 2012).
While seemingly different, these cases were selected due to their strong
emphasis on the entitlements of a legitimate community and strong
otherisation of those seen as excluded from it. While the margin of
appreciation doctrine employed in these cases is familiar  (see e.g.
Yourow 1996) and has been used in multiple earlier cases such as those
related to morality or blasphemy (Handyside 1976; Otto-Preminger
Institut 1994) three main differences can be distinguished between the
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earlier cases and the recent ones. Firstly, the cases come after strong
emphasis  on  religious  and  cultural  pluralism  expressed  both  by  the
Council of Europe and the ECtHR, each emphasising that this pluralism
is a value that is an important asset not only for the majority but also for
minorities (Buscarini 1999; Grzelak 2002; Zengin 2007). Furthermore
in current cases emphasis on the privileges of the community has been
presented through a lens of a conflict of rights that channelled judicial
argumentation towards differentiation between ‘legitimate’ organs
capable of deciding about core majoritarian views and ‘illegitimate’
minoritarian views. Certainly, not all views and lifestyles are protected
under  the  articles  contested  in  all  these  cases,  and  the  balancing  of
appropriate delineation often happens while weighing what is ‘necessary
in a democratic society’ or which rights of others were infringed because
of the applicant’s views or their manifestation (see more: Kratochvil
2011).  In these selected cases, however, another distinguishing feature
is their speculative and unclear explanation of which rights, beyond the
core majoritarian values of the perceived ‘legitimate’ community, were
at risk by allowing these different practices to continue. In most of these
recent cases the ECtHR created an area for its own non-interference with
the competences of national authorities as representatives of the
legitimate community in different cultural conflicts1.  The  Court  also
created the categories that I earlier called ‘radicals’ and ‘barbarians’.
While more complex and harder to identify, the figure of the radical
features prominently in the cases of Lautsi, S.H. and A.B.  and  C.
Meanwhile, it is easier to distinguish the presence of the figure of a
‘barbarian’, as has been observed in many earlier cases (Gozdecka 2015;
2015a;  Jackson  &  Gozdecka  2013).  The S.A.S. case analysed here is
chosen to illustrate the most recent refinement of this category.  The last
case illustrates a fusion between both figures and shows how speculative
evidence can be used in reasoning, distancing the applicants from their
community. Since the category of barbarians has frequently been
explored  (Brown  2008;  Jackson  &  Gozdecka  2012).  I  will  begin  the
analysis  with  the  cases  that  construct  the  radical  –  a  figure  harder  to
pinpoint and more difficult to understand when considering otherising
practices.
In the famous case of Lautsi v. Italy, dealing with the obligatory
display of crucifixes in all state schools in Italy, the reversed judgment
focused little on the requirements of pluralism but instead focused on
1 This focus noticeably modified the Court’s reasoning and approximated it to the reasoning
characteristic  of  another  European  judicial  body,  namely  the  CJEU.  The  CJEU,  being
traditionally the ground for contestation between conflicting legal regimes, has in the past
engaged  in  considerations  on  the  appropriate  regime  for  legitimating  rights.  The  cases  of
Lautsi v. Italy A.B. and C. v. Ireland(A, B and C v. Ireland, 2010) and S.H. v Austria (S.H.
and Others v. Austria,  2011)  explicitly  focused  on  competences,  equating  them  with
legitimacy. In these culturally loaded cases the margin evolved from a tool allowing a certain
leniency towards Member States in determining local understandings of rights to a tool
delineating areas of exclusivity of state competences.
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the ECtHR’s legitimacy to judge in these culturally sensitive cases. In not
so many words, the Court underlined its own lack of legitimacy to judge
on these matters as an organ of the international community and shifted
the  responsibility  back  to  the  local  community  by  stating  that  ‘[i]n
principle it is not for the Court to rule on such questions, as the solutions
may  legitimately  vary  according  to  the  country  and  the  era’  (Lautsi
[Grand Chamber] 2011, para. 68). However, it was the famous
concurring opinion of Judge Bonello that revealed the full otherising
potential of this approach to legitimacy. Bonello emphasised among
others that ‘[i]t is for the Italian authorities, not for this Court, to enforce
secularism if they believe it forms part, or should form part, of the Italian
constitutional architecture’ (para. 2.9). Certainly this approach would
not  differ  from  others  in  similar  cases  if  the  judge  did  not  turn  the
applicant herself into the ‘illegitimate’ other who attacked the very heart
of the legitimate community:
May it please Ms Lautsi, in her own name and on behalf of secularism,
not to enlist the services of this Court to ensure the suppression of the
Italian school calendar, another Christian-cultural heritage that has
survived the centuries without any evidence of irreparable harm to the
progress of freedom, emancipation, democracy and civilisation (para.
1.6).
The cultural other was framed as a radical not entitled to protection
of her beliefs under the principles of pluralism. The mere action she took
in defence of her beliefs was seen as inherently illegitimate and violating
the cultural core of the community she lived in (Gozdecka 2015, 337).
This  turn  towards  prioritising  the  morals  and  traditions  of  the
community found clear expression in the Court’s ‘view that the decision
whether or not to perpetuate a tradition falls in principle within the
margin of appreciation of the respondent State’ (Lautsi [Grand
Chamber] 2011, para. 68). The majoritarian tradition itself became the
source  of  legitimacy,  allowing  disapproval  of  action  taken  by  a status
quo-breaking ‘radical’. As is evident from Judge Bonello’s opinion, the
focus remained solely on what the other can do to the majoritarian
tradition  and  how  this  danger  impacts  the  legitimate  mandate  of  the
community to delineate rights for all. The inclusion of difference or the
rights of the applicant were hardly a consideration when this approach
to legitimacy prevailed in the Grand Chamber’s reasoning.
The Court approached legitimacy similarly in the case of S.H. v.
Austria, dealing with access to assisted procreation. Through fear of
creating ‘illegitimate’ and ‘cosmopolitan’ notions of rights, the Court
emphasised that its ‘task is not to substitute itself for the competent
national authorities in determining the most appropriate policy for
regulating matters of artificial procreation.’(S.H. and Others v. Austria
2011, para. 92). The homogenising vision of the legitimate community
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was, on the other hand, expressed through a focus on the national
authorities’ mandate ‘to give an opinion, (…) “on the exact content of the
requirements of morals” in their country’ (S.H. and Others v.  Austria
2011,  para.  94).   This  view unnaturally  presented the  community  as  a
domocentric and internally homogenous moral space. Plurality of moral
views, on the other hand was dismissed by reference to the legitimate
authorities, presented as the sole custodians of ‘morals’ in their country.
The action by the applicants was again not seen as a matter of their rights
but as a matter of the legitimacy of their local community to define and
narrow rights in accordance with the morals defined by them.
The fusion of the legitimacy discourse with the discourse of morals of
a  national  community  was  also  refined  in  the  case  of  A.B.  and  C.  v
Ireland, where the Court acknowledged the role of the ‘profound moral
views of the majority of the Irish people’ (A, B and C v. Ireland 2010,
para. 241) in limiting access to abortion. These ‘views’ have very recently
turned  out  to  be,  in  fact,  contrary  to  that  assumption  (McDonald,
Graham-Harrison & Baker 2018). In this decision, however, the Court
referred back to legitimacy grounded in protection of those presumed
majoritarian moral views on abortion. The alleged existence of those
views was construed as a legitimate aim in a democratic society and
evaluated  as  striking  a  fair  balance  between  diverse  moral  views  in  a
pluralistic society. Even the fact of a growing European consensus on
access to abortion was found insufficient to minimise the state’s margin
of appreciation in the case of protecting the ‘profound moral views’ of
the majority. Again, the legitimate authorities became custodians of the
moral core of the community defended against community-breaking
‘radicals’. These three cases clearly delineated the protected core of a
domocentric community and shielded it from radical cosmopolitan
notions of rights. The applicants became illegitimate ‘radicals’ appealing
for the protection of illegitimate cosmopolitan notions and contrasted
with legitimate subjects of rights – those adhering to the majoritarian
moral views constituting the core of the community.
In contrast to ‘radicals’ the case of S.A.S. v France (S.A.S. v. France,
2014) refined the long existing category of ‘barbarians’2. S.A.S. is the
most  recent  case  in  a  long  saga  of  cases  concerning  religious  head
covering before the ECtHR (e.g. McGoldrick 2006). In the previous
cases  the  Court  construed  ‘barbarity’  in  diverse  ways,  including  the
applicants’ alleged disrespect for women’s rights. This framing was
particularly strong in Dahlab v. Switzerland (Jackson & Gozdecka 2012)
where the applicant was informed that the decision to wear Islamic
2 Dahlab v. Switzerland, European Court of Human Rights, Decision, Application no.
42393/98, 15 February 2001; Sąhin v Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Grand
Chamber  Judgment,  Application  no.  44774/98,  10  November  2005; Şefika Köse and 93
Others v Turkey, European Court of Human Rights, Decision, Application no. 26625/02, 24
January 2006; Dogru v France, European Court of Human Rights, Judgment, Application no.
27058/05, 4 March 2009.
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covering was ‘hard to square with the principle of gender equality
(Dahlab  v.  Switzerland  2001,  p.  13).  In  contrast,  the  Court  in  S.A.S.
abstained from the simplistic contrasting of the practice of covering with
gender equality and emphasised that ‘a State Party cannot invoke gender
equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women – such as
the  applicant’  (S.A.S.  v  France  2014,  para.  119).   Despite  this  sudden
change in approach, the decision nonetheless maintained the category
of the ‘barbarian’ by employing another type of othering discourse.
Given the growing entitlements of the domocentric community, the
Court strengthened the mandate of the legitimate community by linking
it with the comfort of the majority. As a result the S.A.S. case created a
new  exclusionary  tool  that  can  be  employed  in  the  discourse  of  the
legitimate community and the ‘barbarians’ within – the ‘requirement of
living together’. Despite acknowledging that wearing a face covering may
have legitimate objectives under freedom of expression and freedom of
religion (S.A.S. v. France 2014, para. 119), the very final statements of
the judgment dismiss these objectives and expand the mandate of the
legitimate community to decide whether certain clothing creates
discomfort, thus impacting the conditions of ‘living together’. In other
words the legitimate community, in regulating the practice of veiling,
can decide whether the practice discomforts the majority. The mere
discomfort of being exposed to cultural difference suffices to restrain the
practice  of  the  minority.  The  category  of  ‘living  together’  (S.A.S.  v.
France 2014, para. 142) while presumably meant to be ‘neutral’ created
another strong entitlement of the majority to create norms for the
‘barbarian’ other and prevent practices that disrupt core majoritarian
morals. The legitimacy and homogeneous understanding of community
morals once more merged in an effort to erase otherness and secure the
cultural hegemony of the majority to decide about the shape of protected
rights. The alleged social discomfort caused by dealing with a person
who covers her face not only fails to embody a legally protected right that
would justify the limitation under the Convention but is also highly
speculative.
The last case selected here is the most problematic as it fuses the
figures of the ‘barbarian’ and the ‘radical’ into one. While distanced from
the legitimate community, these two blend into one and present the
same danger to a domocentric cultural core. In the case of Mouvement
raëlien suisse v. Switzerland (Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland
2012) the applicants ‒ whose community of faith takes as its objective
establishing contact with extraterrestrial life ‒ published  a  range  of
posters  with  large  yellow  characters  on  a  dark  blue  background  with
extraterrestrial faces stating ‘The Message from Extraterrestrials’ and
the address of the Raelian Movement’s website. Below another phrase
claimed that ‘Science at last replaces religion’. Due to its classification as
a ‘sect’ the Movement was refused authorization to place the posters on
the  streets.  The  main  objection  from  the  police  was  the  fact  that  the
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Raelian Movement in principle rejects democracy but advocates
government by the most intelligent (‘geniocracy’) and that potentially
and theoretically some of the passages from the writings of the founder
Raël could advocate paedophilia by saying that children are sensual
beings. While the last objection appears to be serious and in contrast to
the ‘discomfort of the majority’, giving potential grounds for limitation
of rights, the police objection was based on passages rejected by the
movement itself. Raelians also emphasized they were running an anti-
pedophilia association devoted to fighting pedophilia in the Catholic
Church – Nopedo ‒ and had a strict policy of rejecting all members on
the slightest suspicion of any intention to abuse minors. The objection
was thus entirely hypothetical and based on the police opinion that
certain passages speaking of children as sensual beings could potentially
and theoretically lead some potential adults to commit acts of child
abuse. While these adults would be unlikely to join the movement due
to its strict denouncement of abuse of minors, the authorities
nonetheless prevented publication of the posters.
In  its  final  judgment  the  ECtHR  once  more  framed  the  margin  of
appreciation doctrine as a matter of competence, underlining that:
In exercising its supervisory function, the Court’s task is not to take
the place of the national courts, but rather to review, in the light of the
case as a whole, whether the decisions they have taken pursuant to
their power of appreciation are compatible with the provisions of the
Convention relied upon (para. 60).
The Court averred that states enjoy a broad margin of appreciation in
‘matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere
of morals or, especially, religion’ (para. 61) and found the posters to only
incidentally refer to social or political ideas, where such a margin would
according to the Court be narrower (para. 62).
Once more developing the doctrine of the margin in the direction of
legitimate competences of a community, the Court insisted that states
are in a better position to assess the situation due to ‘continuous contact
with the vital forces of their countries’ (para. 63) and declined its own
competence to evaluate and ‘interfere with the choices of the national
and local authorities, which are closer to the realities of their country’
(para. 64). The Court declined to ‘substitute its own assessment’ for that
of national authorities (para. 66). In assessing proportionality the Court
referred to the domestic courts’ findings and raised a moral objection to
the teachings of the Raelian Movement, which according to the Court
include ‘offensive’ (para 5.6) ideas such as ‘promotion of human cloning,
the advocating of ‘geniocracy’ and the possibility that the Raelian
Movement’s literature and ideas might lead to sexual abuse of children’
(para. 71). While the movement’s strong anti-paedophilia position was
not addressed, the reference to ideas that ‘might’ lead to abuse
Dorota Gozdecka ’Barbarians’ and ’Radicals’
114
immediately positioned the applicant as an uncivilised ‘barbarian’
dangerous to the legitimate community. The Court also ambiguously
stated that ‘a distinction must be drawn between the aim of the
association and the means that it uses to achieve that aim’ as if implying
that  the  Raelian  movement  was  indeed  contributing  to  possible  child
abuse. Other ideas, while departing from the community’s attachment
to democracy and the legal ban on cloning, were on the other hand seen
as too ‘radical’ and community-breaking. The dual ‘barbarian-radical’
fusion justified the limitation on posters for the protection of the ‘morals
and rights of others’ (para. 72) and for ‘pressing social need’. Classifying
the  Raelians  as  a  sect  and  as  the  Other  allowed  for  dismissal  of  the
organisation’s defence and limiting its rather benign form of self-
promotion to protect the local community from political ideas deemed
too dangerous (para. 74).
5. The asymmetric relationship between the dissident and the
community of rights
The  Court’s  abstention  from  examining  national  laws  addresses  the
problem of legitimacy by placing rights closer to their respective local
communities. However, as illustrated above, the Court also redefined
the local community as entitled to exclude difference for reasons of
protecting its cultural core. Even though the local ‘legitimate’
community  was  placed  as  close  to  defining  rights  as  possible,  the
exclusionary focus expressed the core of  ‘domopolitics’ (Lentin & Titley
2011) signifying the emergence of cohering practices leading to
affirmation of a place of ‘natural belonging’(Lentin & Titley 2011, 206).
The site of a domus is protected from risks coming from sources both
internal  and  external.  The  emphasis  on  cultural  certainty  of  ‘moral
views’, ‘traditions’ or ‘requirements of living together’ marks a
protectionist attitude against both those deemed too radical as well as
those deemed too barbaric to fit  in.  As evident particularly in the IVF
and abortion cases, the adapted notion of ‘community’ holding
legitimacy to decide about rights does not reflect the diversity of the
actual local community but instead reincarnates the traditional notion
of an undiversified national political community. It echoes the
Schmittian emphasis on the unity of social multiplicity as the foundation
of the nation state (Schmitt 1999, 201). This unity in the Schmittian
account would depend on the existence of a community based on
homogeneity and guaranteeing an identity link between the governed
and the governing (Schmitt 1999). If that account of community is taken
as a foundation in the search for legitimacy, rights regimes ‘exclude what
is alien and other. Community as communion accepts human rights only
to the extent that they help submerge the I into the We (…)’ (Douzinas
2013, 59).
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When  the  validity  of  a  claim  challenging  the  cultural status quo is
questioned on the basis of legitimacy, the otherised barbarian or radical
is positioned in striking asymmetry vis-à-vis the legal system. This
framing conceals ‘the deep roots of strife and domination’ and presents
the conflict in terms of ‘law and rights themselves’ (Douzinas 2013, 61).
The denial of ability to challenge the cultural hegemony presents law and
rights as a sphere beyond contestation. Whereas ‘radicals’ and
‘barbarians’ must always justify why they wish to do something different
from  the  majority,  the  majoritarian  system  in  question  is  always
legitimate and freed from that expectation (Simmons 2011, 70–71) in
such  a  vision  of  a  ‘legitimate’  community  of  rights.  When  the  very
existence of legal regulation serves as a means of silencing the rights
claims of ‘radicals’ and ‘barbarians’ and when law is presented as a place
beyond contestation, cultural hegemony can never be successfully
challenged. When appeals to the cultural rights of these dissidents are
seen  as  an  attack  on  the  fundamentals  of  law  rather  than  a  simple
challenge to the essentialist vision of a domocentric community, the
individual is no longer a bearer of rights. Instead it is the state and its values
that are protected from the dissident in the name of ‘tradition’, ‘moral
views’ or ‘secularism’ or ‘requirements of living together’. This asymmetric
position of the dissident vis-à-vis quasi-rights of the domocentric
community (Gozdecka 2015) transforms rights regimes from ‘relative
defence from power to modality of its operations’ (Douzinas 2013, 51).
6. The domocentric community as an extension of the self
As the contemporary rights case-law illustrates, a domocentric
community can be defined by self-referential and exclusionary
definitions leading to exclusivity of rights. This capacity of a community
as a collective to exclude and self-define mirrors the relationship
between the Self and the Other lying at the foundations of Western
philosophy (Cornell 1986). While development of self-understanding
and self-evaluation has been understood as allowing the egocentric
individual to adopt a position vis-à-vis the other (Benhabib 1992, 72),
the legitimacy mechanism illustrated above mirrors this egocentrism of
the individual. A domocentric community focusing on self-referential
notions of rights mirrors the egocentricity of the self and creates limits
of itself by excluding otherness in a very similar way to that described by
Derrida – by drawing the boundary of what the self is not (Derrida 1998,
197). When human rights law and jurisprudence act as a system drawing
limits and excluding the other in the very same way, as does the self, then
rights must exclude by definition. A narrow reading of community and
its ‘identity’ parallels the individual’s egoistic need to reaffirm their
authenticity (Taylor 1992, 50). Whereas in the act of self-definition
individualism ‘forgets that every person is a world and comes into
existence in common with others’ (Douzinas 2013, 59), reliance on a self-
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referential definition of community compels the other to merge into the
common essence. By assuming self-referential and exclusionary
definitions, the community can erase the ‘individuality and concrete
identity  of  the  Other’  (Benhabib  1992,  158)  in  the  same  way  an
egocentric self does. In contrast to the individual, the community
constructs the other in opposition to the community’s self-proclaimed
characteristics and expels every identity that does not fall within the self-
definition.
Therefore the state’s employment of rights in the name of a
domocentric  community  will  ‘interpret  and  apply  them,  if  at  all,
according  to  local  legal  procedures  and  moral  principles,  making  the
universal  the  handmaiden  of  the  particular’  (Douzinas  2013,  60).
Reference to particular national, cultural or economic groups most often
translates these groups into elements of a dominant majority (Patton
2010, 69). This paradoxical employment of the notion of a community
may  lead  to  what  Balibar  calls  the  absolutisation  of  the  community
(Balibar  2013,  24).  In  an  absolutised  domocentric  community,  rights
become merely competing claims prone to be employed in the interest
of the existing model of the community and serving no more than
rejection of the possibility of resistance (Balibar 2013, 24–25). When the
concept of a ‘community’ is employed to suppress multiplicity in the
name of cultural or national essence, the legitimising nature of a
community disappears. The ‘community’ which submerges difference
into homogeneity can no longer legitimise. The legitimising process is a
process aimed at preventing abuses of power. A ‘community’ whose
central aim is to protect itself from otherness signifies the modality of
the operations of power, not a counterbalance to power. Rights
employed in defence of the homogeneity of the ‘community’, on the
other hand, become tools curtailing the possibility of emancipation and
resistance. As a consequence, rights mutate and result in reversal of their
original idea: from emancipation to domination and from liberation to
exclusion and fear.
7. Can the emancipatory potential of rights be reconstructed?
Employing  rights  in  cultural  battles  and  the  tendency  of  rights  to
retaliate  against  themselves  may  lead  to  pessimistic  conclusions.  But
must human rights be of no more than symbolic value? (Zizek 2005) If
human  rights  remain  mere  tools  in  struggles  for  power,  (Zizek  2005)
those struggling for recognition are left without alternative legal means
of contestation. As Benhabib recalls, the critical project of
postmodernism can be instructive about political  traps and roads that
lead foundational thinking astray, but it should not lead to retreat from
Utopia altogether (Benhabib 1992, 230). Therefore, following Simmons,
I would argue for constantly rethinking and constantly identifying roads
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leading astray rather than abandoning the road in the face of the current
crisis of rights (Simmons 2011, 28). Instead of abandonment, rethinking
what has been identified as the potential of rights for empowerment
(Kinley 2012) appears a useful solution, albeit certainly to some degree
Utopian. Any possible reconstruction of that potential must focus on the
notions of emancipation and resistance.
As pointed out by Levinasian-inclined thinkers, (Douzinas 2000;
Simmons 2011, Gozdecka 2016) rebuilding the emancipatory potential
of rights can be founded on the idea of responsibility and answerability.
This rebuilding process can meaningfully respond to the problem of the
exclusionary potential of rights based on the self and its self-definition
(Lévinas  1994,  96).  If  we  base  the  idea  of  a  right  on  the  Levinasian
understanding of answerability, the right ceases to be seen as a privilege
for Levinas asserts that instead of a privilege rights should be seen as a
‘duty to the other for which I am answerable’ (Lévinas 1994, 98). If the
idea of an interest is replaced with the idea of a duty, the set of relevant
questions  changes.   Rather  than  asking  ‘Who  am  I?  What  is  my
community?’ and ‘What is our interest’ the first consideration is ‘What
am I answerable for?’ This idea of rights puts the other before the self in
an  act  of  inexhaustible  responsibility  (Lévinas  1994,  98).  The
responsibility-based reading of Lévinas is almost contrary to the Gerin
Report’s reading of the philosopher, where face-covering was discussed
at length by the French Parliament in reference to Levinasian theory
(Gerin Report 2010). Despite explicit references to Lévinas, the
understanding  of  the  face ‒ used  by  Lévinas  as  the  source  of
responsibility ‒ was reduced to the visibility of the face to the Self with
little or no regard to responsibility for the other. The other was instead
accused of withholding communication and violating the Self (Gerin
Report  2010,  116),  something  rather  contrary  to  what  Lévinas  meant
while discussing the importance of the face. For Lévinas, the first duty is
responsibility for the other, even the other that the Self may not be able
to understand, rather than the centrality ‒ or preventing the discomfort
of ‒ the Self. The act of defining who I am or what our cultural tradition
is becomes perhaps not entirely irrelevant, but certainly secondary.
Rights seen as duties relieve the binary tension between the self and the
other  and  the  community  and  its  Other.  A  community  based  on
answerability instead of drawing limits for itself and its interest appears
to have a more promising potential for legitimating rights.
It  is  nonetheless  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  the  act  of
responsibility  can  be  fulfilled  only  in  the  presence  of  a  third  person
(Lévinas 1991). If the Self or the community becomes responsible and
answerable for the rights of the other, the central difficulty remains: how
can we reconcile responsibility for the rights of all the others? How can
responsibility respond to the marginalisation of some ‒ but  not  all ‒
others? Relying solely on the notion of responsibility leaves us with this
central ambiguity of Levinasian theory. Criticised for its ethical and
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purely philosophical focus,  Levinasian theory on its own may lack the
potential to effectively translate answerability into the realm of the
political (Badiou 2001; Simmons 2011, 90). Can ethical philosophy
provide the answer to the question how to respond to diversity? (Smith
2009, 68–71.)
The first problem to solve is translation of the abstract ontological
focus  of  the  self  and  the  other  to  the  domain  of  rights  and  politics.
Remaining on an abstract and general level, ethics challenges modernity
but  lacks  the  potential  to  respond  to  the  demands  of  real  life  (Smith
2009, 71). While Levinasian reformulations focus on the generalised Self
and the Generalised other, the sole idea of a right as a duty rather than
a privilege can be translated to the concrete Self and the concrete Other.
The shift from the abstract to the concrete allows for true
contextualisation of rights in the context of difference (Benhabib 1992,
159). This standpoint of the concrete Other is necessary for a community
to understand whose voices have been marginalised. Without this
realisation ‘the other cannot interrogate the original violence of the
system’s institutions’ (Simmons 2011, 124).
The second difficulty is the relational nature of responsibility. After
all, even the standpoint of a particular Other does not offer a sufficiently
illuminating and effective tool in the realm of the political. The central
dilemma remains the unsolvable nature of responsibility towards a third
person. Even a duty to be responsible for the rights of the concrete Other
requires an answer to the question how to be responsible for all the
concrete others. The end result of responsibility for all the Others may
be identical to that of equal freedom for all. Equal responsibility ‒ just
as equal freedom ‒ may lead to the emergence of incompatible claims
and ‘possible war’ (Lévinas 1994, 95) between different responsibilities.
Consequently  responsibility  as  the  foundation  of  rights,  just  like
freedom, may lead to the impossibility of emancipation.
8. Responsibility for emancipation as a form of legitimacy
Simmons asserts that, to prevent hegemonic developments, democracy
must be at the service of the other and so must human rights institutions
(Simmons 2011). But due to the difficulties noted above with translating
the ethical to the political, taking the viewpoint of the other requires
defining hegemony and emancipation. Rebuilding the emancipatory
logic of rights in the sphere of the political requires complementing the
responsibility-based understanding of rights by elaborating the notion
of emancipation.
The tendency of rights to exclude and the danger of ‘wars’ between
freedoms or responsibilities necessitates consideration of a minoritarian
premise in the jurisprudence of rights. Minoritarian notions of
emancipation from hegemony range from the focus of a revolutionary
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event, through freedom from racial hegemony to dissent of those
marginalised (Hewlett 2010, 1–3). Yet in the contemporary world
hegemony no longer signifies single-axis relations of power (Balibar
2013, 22). Hegemonising discourses may stem from systemic structures,
political concerns of legitimacy, new forms of cultural racism as well as
from other sources as yet unidentified. Thus for responsibility towards
the other to be a meaningful reconstructive effort, it is essential to adopt
a notion of emancipation responding to the changing and often diffused
structures  of  power  that  may  marginalise  the  other  in  diverse  ways.
Balibar suggests that tentatively the answer to who is the one to be
emancipated must depend on the local situation, the cases considered,
the type of issue and the choices made by the agents themselves (Balibar
2013, 22).
In this diffused landscape of emancipatory calls, the value protected
must be the freedom to think or act differently. Rosa Luxemburg’s
understanding of freedom and the nature of revolutionary events
provides  us  with  a  useful  guideline  on  how  to  contextualise  an
emancipatory call in a setting of diverse hegemonic powers:
Freedom is  always  and  exclusively  freedom for  the  one  who thinks
differently.  Not  because  of  any  fanatical  concept  of  ‘justice’  but
because  all  that  is  instructive,  wholesome and  purifying  in  political
freedom depends on this essential characteristic, and its effectiveness
vanishes when ‘freedom’ becomes a special privilege (Luxemburg,
1918, 69).
Only freedom from hegemonic power of those in a minority has true
emancipatory potential. Emancipation is thus the freedom of a minority3
that seeks to break the constraints of a system that marginalises and
oppresses it. The established ‘freedom’ of those in power is not a value
requiring protection. Its emancipatory potential vanishes in the instant
when majoritarian norms become institutionalised. The freedom of the
majority in all circumstance has achieved its goal and can no longer be
realised. It cannot emancipate because it has become translated into the
dominant system. As if parallel to the Levinasian account, the freedom
of the majority is no longer a freedom but a privilege for the ‘I’ and for
the ‘we’.
Thus the effort to reconstruct the emancipatory logic of rights
requires  framing  rights  as  a  responsibility  towards  the  Other  for  the
possibility of emancipation (Gozdecka 2015b). This notion of rights
holds a promise of curtailing exclusionary battles between different
communities and offers inclusive rather than exclusive discussions of
rights legitimacy. Rights as a responsibility rather than a privilege and
3 Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of minority is particularly illuminating in this context.
A minority is not necessarily numerical but may instead be a numerical majority yet rendered
less dominant. (Deleuze & Guattari 1980)
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emancipation rather than establishment of achieved freedom promise
effective entry to discussions on the polity or judicial organ best able to
protect rights. In contrast, established freedom fossilises rights and
prevents dynamic approaches. Instead of being a space for
renegotiation, a domocentric and homogenous community becomes a
static and stagnant structure upholding diverse forms of domination.
This  structure  lacks  the  capacity  to  legitimate  due  to  its  inability  to
curtail power.
Rights understood as a responsibility for emancipating the other offer
an alternative form of legitimacy. If we base rights on responsibility
towards the Other for the possibility of emancipation, determining
which polity, judicial system or institution is most legitimate need no
longer to be based on potentially exclusive notions. Securing the most
democratic  source  and  remedy  in  the  area  of  rights  will  depend  on
determining which polity, institution or judicial organ is best able to
respond and prevent marginalising forces of diverse structures of
domination. The organ, structure or system that will allow the voice of
the other to be heard and best respond to the other’s call for
emancipation will be the best suited for legitimate intervention. Abstract
notions of a legitimate community, collective identity or the position of
rights between different legal regimes will never suffice to effectively
respond  to  the  call  for  emancipation.  The  legitimacy  of  rights  is  thus
relational and requires full contextualisation of the agents and powers
involved and a response to the question whose emancipation we are
responsible for.
9. Conclusions
The analysis above does not aim to dismiss concerns over legitimacy
altogether. Quite the contrary, its objective is to secure the democratic
legitimacy of rights so that the dialogue between different communities
occurs without recourse to antagonistic struggles and exclusive notions.
These antagonisms result in no more than homogenising notions of a
community  and  exclusion  of  those  selectively  framed  as  standing
outside. These same antagonisms also silence dissent and fossilise
communities into non-negotiable structures of hegemony. A
homogeneous and domocentric community necessarily turns rights
against those framed as a ‘danger’. Legitimacy of rights should therefore
be understood differently from mere privileges to decide on the shape of
rights. The notion of a right based on the idea of a privilege will always
necessarily result in the entanglement of rights with ‘powers of the state’
(Lévinas 1994, 96) and exclusive notions of a community. Therefore
rebuilding the logic of rights is imperative for a discussion on their most
‘appropriate’ sources.  Only rights understood as responsibility towards
the other for the possibility of emancipation can result in legitimate
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construction, application and adjudication of rights. The ontological
question on the nature of a political community and its legitimacy must
be preceded by the notion of responsibility and the role of rights as
emancipatory tools. With these notions at the foundation, the question
of legitimacy appears more complex than simple questions of
competences and requires examination of who is best suited to respond
to the emancipatory call of the Other.
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